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April 9, 2021 
Abstract 
One way for economists to influence economic policy and society as a whole is to shape what Robert 
Shiller has called “economic narratives”. This, in turn, puts the media in their role as professional sto-
rytellers in a central position. In this paper, I investigate how economists have been covered by the 
media in a long-term perspective. Particularly, I address two questions: How has the quantitative visi-
bility of economists in the media developed over time? And how can news stories covering economists 
be characterized in terms of their content? I answer these questions in two steps. First, I provide a com-
parison of economists’ quantitative media visibility in international newspapers. Second, building on a 
corpus of more than 12,000 newspaper articles, I conduct a case study on the German Council of Eco-
nomic Experts. Using various text mining approaches, I survey four features of newspaper coverage: 
topics, tonality, temporal perspective, and the role of individuals. Finally, based on extensive close read-
ing, I briefly discuss two key turning points in the media history of economists, namely the 1980s and 
the late 1990s/early 2000s. The main finding is that economists have indeed become silent compared to 
their heyday of economic expertise in the 1960s, but that they have not been as silent as is often claimed. 
Keywords: economic experts, economic narratives, media analysis, topic modelling, sentiment 
analysis 
JEL-Codes: N01, P16, Z13 
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“What unites people? Armies, gold, flags? Stories. There is nothing in the world 
more powerful than a good story. Nothing can stop it. No enemy can defeat it.” 
Tyrion Lannister1 
1. Introduction2 
There are several ways in which economists can influence economic policy and, thus, fulfill 
John Maynard Keynes’ famous appraisal that “[p]ractical men who believe themselves to be 
quite exempt from any intellectual influence, are usually the slaves of some defunct econo-
mist.”3 They might offer their expertise directly to decision-makers; this is best described by 
using Alvin Roth’s metaphor of economists “whispering in the ears of princes”4 in the back 
rooms of politics. Alternatively, they might step out of the dark and into the (lime-)light, taking 
part in public discourse and trying to convince the general public that certain economic ideas 
are preferable to others, thus influencing decision-makers through the pressure of public opin-
ion.5 Although the first approach is, ideally, more direct,6 the effect of the latter should not be 
underrated. After all, this latter approach involves economists not only reaching out to decision 
makers but also influencing public discourse as whole by shaping economic narratives. These 
narratives can, in turn, be very influential, a fact which is addressed by Robert Shiller, among 
others. Shiller states that “[p]opular thinking often drives decisions that ultimately affect deci-
sions, such as how and where to invest, how much to spend or save, and whether to go to college 
or take a certain job.”7 Although the causal relationship between “popular thinking”, that is, 
economic stories, and economic outcomes is less clear, there is no doubt that narratives can 
shape people’s thoughts, feelings, and, eventually, their behavior. If we accept the fact that 
stories are, indeed, an efficacious method of influencing and persuading also at an economic 
 
1 Game of Thrones, season eight, episode six. 
2 The main conclusions given in this paper result from my doctoral thesis presented at the University of Regensburg 
in November 2020. 
3 Keynes (2018, 340). In 1902, Irving Fisher had come to the opposite conclusion that “economists have altogether 
too little influence; they are too silent on public questions, and when they do speak their opinion commands less 
respects than it deserves.” Bernstein (2001, 15). 
4 Roth (1986, 246). 
5 Hirschman and Berman (2014) provide a comprehensive overview of the various ways in which economists can 
become influential. See also, e.g., Backhouse (2005), Backhouse and Cherrier (2017), Popp Berman (2017). 
6 A problem connected to direct policy advice, at least in democratic societies, is that it is generally not sufficient 
to convince individual politicians as there always needs to be a political majority to actually implement economic 
ideas. 
7 Shiller (2019, 3). See also Shiller (2017) and Akerlof and Shiller (2009). At this point, it is worth referring to 
Deidre McCloskey who, in a 1991 article, quotes Peter Brooks: “Our lives are ceaselessly intertwined with narra-
tive, with the stories that we tell, all of which are reworked in that story of our own lives that we narrate to ourselves 
[…] We are immersed in narrative.” Brooks (1992, 3) as quoted in McCloskey (1991, 7). Indeed, Shiller’s “Nar-
rative Economics” can be compared to the concept of “humanomics”, see McCloskey (2016). 
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level, the next step is to take a closer look at these stories and the players who, in a professional 
way, assume the role of storytellers.8 This brings us back to the “Econ tribe”,9 whose members 
also communicate through stories, both with their peers and with the public. As Deidre McClos-
key puts it: 
“Plainly and routinely, ninety per cent of what economists do is such storytelling. Yet even in 
the other ten per cent, in the part more obviously dominated by models and metaphors, the 
economist tells stories […] Economics is saturated with narration.”10 
Adam Smiths’ invisible hand, presumably the most famous economic metaphor, is just one 
obvious example of this kind of storytelling. Other popular metaphors used by economists refer, 
for instance, to diseases or natural disasters.11 Persuasive storytelling is particularly important 
for economists who are engaged in the business of policy advice.12 If we take the German 
Council of Economic Experts (GCEE) as an example, we find that its annual reports are written 
not only in a technical, strictly scientific but also in a rather literary style.13 
In this paper, however, I want to focus on a different group of (economic) narrators: the media, 
or, more precisely, print media.14 The media can be regarded as the central agency in shaping 
public discourse during the 20th century; they might be regarded, in the words of Shiller, as 
 
8 According to Shiller (2019, 3), stories “spread through word of mouth, the news media, and social media”.  
9 Leijonhufvud (1973). In terms of their propensity to reach out through the media, Alex Millmow and Jerry 
Courvisanos differentiate between two tribes of the Econ. See below. 
10 McCloskey (1991, 9), see also McCloskey (2016; 1990). 
11 Pühringer and Hirte (2015). 
12 See, e.g., Pinto (2014). 
13 It is difficult for non-German speakers to check this point, but large parts of the Council’s reports, especially 
those from the 1970s, are formulated in a rather narrative style. See also Strätling (2001, 290) 
14 I focus on print media mainly because I am interested in the long-term perspective, for which other types of 
media data are not or are only partially available. To be sure, there has been a tremendous increase in the variety 
and use of different types of media. The shift towards the “new media” has undeniably reduced the impact of 
traditional print outlets, a process which had already started in the 1970s and 1980s when a first wave of newspaper 
consolidation took place. Before the internet, it was the advent of television which caused people to spend less 
time reading newspapers. For example, in 1964, Germans spent an average of 35 minutes a day reading newspa-
pers, which dropped to a mere 23 minutes by 2015. For figures on media consumption, see Krupp and Breunig 
(2016). For a more general account of the development of German media, see Pürer (2015) and Wilke (1999). In 
the following, I will use the terms “media”, “press”, and “newspapers” synonymously. There are, of course, also 
other kinds of storytellers that could be considered in the context of this paper, such as politicians, consultants, 
and advertisers. Of less interest to the historian but nevertheless important from a contemporary perspective are 
those new storytellers that have emerged from the social media revolution. Indeed, social media provide the chance 
for anyone to become a storyteller by means of a YouTube channel or a Twitter account, or, to use a more fash-
ionable term, anyone can be an “influencer”. The growing relevance of this group of storytellers is, among other 
things, reflected in their economic potential. According to a survey conducted by the “Influencer Marketing Hub”, 
the global market for influencer marketing amounted to 6.5 billion US-dollars in 2019. See Influencer Marketing 
Hub (2020). 
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“super-spreaders”15 of economic stories. This is not only because economists rely on the media 
to promote their ideas, for example in guest features and interviews. The media are even more 
important as, just as the meaning of the word indicates, they presumably are the major channel 
through which an economic idea is transmitted to the lay public once it has left an economist’s 
head. In other words, ordinary people do not normally tend to read articles published in the 
American Economic Review, but they might pick up an economic idea while reading their fa-
vorite New York Times column at breakfast. In this way, (economic) news can indeed shape the 
economy, as, for example, research on the impact of news sentiment on financial markets has 
shown.16 It must be noted, though, that journalists do not simply carry economic stories from 
economists to their audience, but also shape these stories, providing opinion alongside objective 
news. As gatekeepers,17 they decide which economist and which economic idea is forwarded 
to the public and which is not, thus shaping economists’ public image.18 
But what do we know about the characteristics of media stories that include references to econ-
omists? The short answer is: not much. The long answer is: Although there is a considerable 
amount of literature on the relationship between media output and the economy, particularly 
relating to financial markets, and, to a lesser degree, relating to the historical impact of business 
and financial journalism,19 there has been surprisingly little research on the media visibility of 
specific economists or economic institutions, at least in Germany.20 The common narrative here 
is that the media visibility of economists has been in decline since the 1970s, as expressed, for 
example, by Michael Bernstein, who states “that economists today enjoy great amounts of 
power and influence, even prestige in some circles. But they do so in private, and increasingly 
 
15 Shiller (2019, 20). 
16 Here, the literature on investor sentiment following the seminal work by Tetlock (2007) is particularly notewor-
thy. See Raimondo (2019) for an overview. 
17 For an account of the journalistic gatekeeper metaphor and others metaphors, see Tandoc Jr. (2018). Tandoc 
rightly points out that the gatekeeper metaphor has become less suitable in times of communication via digital 
platforms. 
18 Indeed, the reputation of economists has been tainted in recent years. For example, in a 2017 survey of Britons 
performed by the data analytics firm YouGov, 44 percent of respondents answered the question “Of the following, 
whose opinions do you tend to trust when they talk about their fields of expertise?” by stating that they did not 
trust economists, whereas only 25 percent said that they trusted them (the remaining 31 percent did not know). 
Historians, for example, received much better figures: 71 percent of respondents said that they trusted them, and 
only ten percent said they did not. Journalists themselves also seem to suffer from a lack of trust. In another British 
survey in 2020, more than half of respondents stated that they have either not much or no trust at all in “upmarket” 
newspaper journalists such as those working for newspaper like The Times. See Smith (2017) and Ibbetson (2020). 
19 See, e.g., Campbell, Turner, and Walker (2012), Hanna, Turner, and Walker (2020), Daniel, Neubert, and Orban 
(2018), Turner, Ye, and Walker (2017). 
20 See Knauß (2016) and Rieder and Theine (2019). Instructive pieces on the general history of German business 
and financial journalism include Kutzner (2019), Nützenadel (2008), and Radu (2017). 
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in silence.”21 But, to my best knowledge, there is no study that actually measures economists’ 
media visibility in a long-term perspective.22 In other words, we do not have empirical evidence 
about whether economists have de facto become silent – or invisible for that matter – or whether 
this claim is, to exaggerate the point, just the biased view of some economists who feel ignored. 
In this paper, I will address this topic by focusing on two aspects of economists’ media visibil-
ity: first, the quantitative amount of visibility in the media; second, some formal and content-
related characteristics of this specific news coverage, which might help to explain fluctuations 
in the quantitative amount of media visibility. Particularly, I will provide answers to the fol-
lowing two questions: How much attention have economists received from the media and how 
has this attention evolved over time? How can we characterize news stories that refer to econ-
omists? In short, I am interested in quantifying and characterizing the media stories associated 
with economists. To this aim, I will proceed in two steps. After discussing the data and methods 
in Section 2, I will provide a comparison of economists’ quantitative media visibility in various 
newspapers published in Germany, the US, and the UK in Section 3. The results suggest that 
economists have shared a common fate in these countries in terms of media attention, although 
there is a somewhat particular development for Germany around the year 2000. The results of 
this comparison, however, do not (and cannot) reveal anything about the actual content of the 
articles mentioning economists. This second aspect will be covered in a case study on the GCEE 
in Section 4, in which I will focus on four dimensions of newspaper content which can be 
regarded as defining aspects of (economic) stories: topics (4.1), tonality (4.2), temporal per-
spective (4.3), and the role of individuals (4.4).23 The first and presumably most important di-
mension relates to the content of the articles, or, in other words, to the question: “What are the 
articles that mention the GCEE about?” In the literature on the GCEE, one finds the claim that 
journalists mainly report on the Council’s economic forecast,24 but is this really the case? Are 
there other topics related to the GCEE that attract media attention? The second dimension re-
lates to the tonality of articles that mention the GCEE. One might hypothesize that, in general, 
 
21 Bernstein (2001, 144). See also Sent (2005). This narrative of decline is shared by many German journalists 
particularly concerning the GCEE. See, e.g., Nienhaus und Schulz (2016). 
22 Of course, popular rankings such as the ranking of Germany’s most influential economists conducted by the 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung provide information on how often certain economists are cited by the media. This 
data, however, is available only for recent years and does not cover mentions of economic institutions such as 
research institutes. 
23 Naturally, there are more aspects that could be addressed, for example relating to formal aspects of media cov-
erage, such as authorship or journalistic genres. The study of these aspects, however, requires data – or rather 
metadata – which, at time of writing, is not available for most German newspapers and/or is too costly to obtain. 
24 Schanetzky (2007, 79). 
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economists are most frequently quoted by journalists in times of turmoil and crisis when the lay 
public is in particular need of economic expertise. This would suggest that the tone of such 
articles is rather negative. It is, however, also possible that the opposite is the case and that 
economists are cited to emphasize economic success stories. Both hypotheses suggest that 
measuring general tonality of articles might be revealing, especially because media sentiment 
influences the sales figures of news magazines, that is, the demand for media output.25 The third 
dimension covers the temporal perspective of newspaper coverage. In particular, it is of interest 
whether journalists refer to economists in stories concerning the future, the present, or the past. 
As the example of the GCEE shows, economists provide expertise for the past, the present, and 
the future, although the common narrative mentioned above implies that journalists mainly fo-
cus on the present and the (near) future. But, again, there is no empirical evidence indicating 
whether this is actually the case, which necessitates a quantitative assessment of articles’ tem-
poral perspective. Whereas the main part of the analysis covers the Council as an institution, 
the last dimension touches upon the issue of personal media attention. The GCEE, just like any 
institution that advises policy, is also visible through its members. Actually, one might hypoth-
esize that, as a result of the media’s increasing focus on individuals since the 1990s,26 the media 
presence of individual members has also become more important. As each dimension provides 
sufficient material to fill a paper of its own, I will only briefly outline their respective develop-
ments. In order to contextualize the quantitative findings, I will conclude this section with a 
brief look at two particularly important periods: the 1980s and early 2000s (Section 4.5). Sec-
tion 5 will summarize the main findings. 
2. Data and Methods 
Drawing from several digital newspaper archives, I collected two sets of newspaper data, each 
corresponding to a distinct level of abstraction. The comparative perspective provided in Sec-
tion 3 is based on data that can, directly or indirectly, be derived from the newspaper archives 
themselves. Essentially, I conducted a count search of articles containing the keyword “econo-
mist” and then, to provide a comparison, repeated the process for both “historian” and “scien-
tist”. The results are standardized by dividing the number of articles identified by the overall 
 
25 Arango-Kure, Garz, and Rott (2014). 
26 Hachmeister and Siering (2002, 16). 
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number of articles published in the newspaper under investigation.27 In other words, the results 
are proportions of the number of articles containing at least one occurrence of the search term. 
The second kind of data used in Section 4, is somewhat different. Here, the analysis concen-
trates on the actual newspaper content and covers four dimensions: article topics, tonality, tem-
poral perspective, and focus on people. Contrary to the bird’s eye view taken in Section 3, this 
kind of data affords a more detailed picture of the news stories associated with economists. For 
this close-up picture, I manually selected a corpus of articles containing references to the GCEE. 
Some descriptive statistics of this corpus are presented in Table 1. In total, the corpus includes 
12,553 articles from five leading German newspapers and magazines and amounts to more than 
9.9 million words. As the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) is the only daily newspapers 
covered throughout the whole investigation period, it naturally takes up a considerable propor-
tion of the corpus.28 All articles contain at least one explicit reference to the Council, either with 
the official term “Sachverständigenrat” (council) or “Wirtschaftsweise” (wise men), the Ger-
man nickname for its members.29 The selection of these particular outlets was driven by the 
availability of digital archives spanning a longer time period, as well as local access to these 
archives. For the Handelsblatt and Wirtschaftswoche, the digital archive was only available 
from the mid-1980s onwards, which is why I consulted printed tables of content for the time 
before 1984 for the latter publication.30 Overall, the selection can be regarded as being quite 
representative of the political spectrum, spanning from the conservative FAZ to the liberal 
Zeit.31 
 
27 This step is necessary in order to control for potential changes in newspaper size or changes in the archive 
structure. 
28 For readers not familiar with the German newspaper market, some remarks on the selection seem appropriate. 
All five outlets have nationwide outreach and can be regarded as leading newspapers, at least for most of the period 
that is being investigated. While Handelsblatt and Wirtschaftswoche mainly focus on economic/business-related 
topics, the remaining three also cover other topics. 
29 Articles referring to other councils such as the Sachverständigenrat für Umweltfragen were removed after review 
of each article. 
30 A manual screening of the daily Handelsblatt was not feasible.  
31 Hoeres (2019, 421–31), Eilders, Neidhardt, and Pfetsch (2004), Kepplinger (2000, 42–46). 
8 












daily 5,011 39.9% 3,151,865 31.5% 2.8 
Handelsblatt (HB)a) daily 3,778 30.1 2,324,999 23.3 2.8 
Spiegel weekly 638 5.1 1,178,803 11.8 3.0 
Volkswirt / Wirtschaftswocheb) weekly 1,846 14.7 1,939,339 19.4 3.7 
Die Zeit weekly 1,280 10.2 1,396,502 14.0 4.1 
Total  12,553 100.0 9,991,508 100.0 3.1 
a) Starting 07/01/1986. b) Renamed into Wirtschaftswoche in 1973. Sources: author’s own calculations. 
 
I applied several text mining approaches on this corpus to capture the topics, tonality, temporal 
perspective, and focus on people of the articles. The first two aspects were investigated using 
topic modelling and sentiment analysis, for which there are numerous introductory pieces,32 
which is why I only explain the specific application of both approaches in this paper. Regarding 
the topic model, following several trials I set the number of topics to 95, as this number resulted 
in a satisfactory compromise between topics either becoming too general or too specific and 
redundant.33 In order to keep the scope of the paper manageable and to provide a more general 
picture of the topical structure, I aggregated the 95 individual topics into 15 categories accord-
ing to their topical similarity. These “main topics” can be regarded as more general themes, 
with individual topics representing specific aspects of those themes. For example, the main 
topic Labor Market includes topics associated with unemployment and labor unions. Regarding 
corpus preprocessing, I removed common but meaningless words based on a stop word list 
customized to the corpus vocabulary.34 Additionally, I removed short articles, as they do not 
normally contain significant content. Specifically, I removed all articles with less than 400 to-
kens, thus leaving 8,084 articles to go into the model. The model itself was created using 
MALLET35 with the built-in hyperparameter optimization applied and 2,000 iterations per-
formed.36 
 
32 For methodological accounts on topic modelling and sentiment analysis, see Blei (2012), Feldman (2013), 
Kearny and Liu (2014), Liu (2015), Wehrheim (2019a). 
33 For an overview of all 95 topics, see the online appendix. 
34 Stop words are terms such as “the”, “and”, “or” and so on. I removed all terms which appeared in at least 1,000 
instances, although allowing some central terms to be considered. 
35 McCallum (2002). 
36 I learned only after completing the model that MALLET provides the option to specify a seed number, which 
allows the model to be replicated. On the issue of replicability, which is a major issue in topic modelling, see e.g. 
Maier et al. (2018). 
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While, from a technical standpoint, it is easy to infer the topic or topics of a text, it is much 
more difficult to automatically determine the way these topics are described in terms of tonality 
or, to use the more common term, sentiment. While there are sentences with clear and explicit 
(positive or negative) sentiment, such as “company X has performed poorly”, other sentiment 
expressions are more implicit and, therefore, more difficult to detect. This is aggravated by 
comparative expressions, for example “Germany is doing a lot better than France”, and other 
problems such as figurative speech or irony. Furthermore, one must also account for the fact 
that the sentiment attached to a word depends on its context, which is particularly important for 
economic descriptions. For example, “unemployment” may carry positive, negative, or neutral 
sentiment, depending on signal words such as “increasing”, “decreasing”, or “constant”.37 De-
spite the manifold challenges, there is a growing number of applications of this type of analysis, 
especially in the field of economics and finance.38 To measure the textual sentiment of GCEE-
related news coverage, I applied a sentiment dictionary containing a predefined list of sentiment 
bearing words.39 Based on this dictionary, the number of positive and negative words in a given 
document are counted and then divided by the overall number of words. For this approach, it is 
particularly important to use context specific dictionaries as many words carry different senti-
ment in different settings. Again, “unemployment” is negative in most documents, but may also 
carry neutral or even positive sentiment in an economic context.40 For the German language, 
there is a dictionary specifically designed for a business context and which comes closest to the 
language used in the corpus studied in this paper.41 Applying this dictionary can, naturally, only 
yield an approximation as it was not created for this particular corpus. Therefore, results were 
compared to another, more general German sentiment dictionary, the Sentiment Wortschatz 
(SentiWS).42 However, in light of the limitations described so far, it must be noted that the 
results of the sentiment analysis are only estimations of the general tonality of documents and 
do not reveal sentiment in relation to specific entities or topics.43 
 
37 Malo et al. (2014). 
38 See the overviews provided by Kearney and Liu (2014) and Raimondo (2019). 
39 The other main approach to measuring textual sentiment, which is based on machine learning, could not be 
applied in this project due to lack of training data. 
40 Loughran and McDonald (2011). 
41 Bannier, Pauls, and Walter (2019). This dictionary is based on a translation from the English finance dictionary 
provided by Loughran and McDonald (2011). 
42 Remus, Quasthoff, and Heyer (2010). The current version of SentiWS was published in 2018. 
43 Balahur and Steinberger (2009, 3f) summarize this problem as follows: “[D]ocument level sentiment analysis 
does not make the necessary distinction between a number of different possible targets. Furthermore, it does not 
distinguish good or bad news from good or bad sentiment expressed in the article.” 
10 
The third dimension – temporal perspective – is captured by two indices, both of which, in 
essence, build on term frequencies. For the first index, I searched the corpus for all four-digit 
numbers ranging between 1,800 and 2,100 using regular expressions, working on the assump-
tion that most of the resulting figures would refer to years. Subsequently, I applied a simple if-
then rule. If the search result mentioned in a document was smaller than, greater than, or equal 
to the document’s publication year, this single unit received the label “past”, “future”, or “pre-
sent”, respectively. This procedure, however, has its weaknesses. After checking the results it 
became obvious that some search hits do not refer to a year, for example “2,100 Euro”, or if 
they do, they may not represent a date, for instance, in references to Gerhard Schröder’s 
“Agenda 2010”.44 Furthermore, journalists regularly refer to time without using specific dates.45 
This is why I applied a second approach by building a corpus-based dictionary of common 
German time references such as “bald” (soon) or “jahrelang” (for years). The first step was to 
compile a list of time-references based on the corpus vocabulary by screening the 2,500 most 
frequent words,46 as well as the 1,000 most frequent bi- and trigrams, respectively, in order to 
account for expressions such as “nächstes Jahr” (next year). The second step was to extend the 
wordlist by including inflections and common variations of the entries identified in step one, 
for example “nächsten zehn Jahre” (next ten years). It is important to note that this time dic-
tionary includes different word classes, such as temporal adverbs, nouns, adjectives, and ngram 
combinations of the various word classes. While compiling the list, it became obvious that it 
has similar limitations to a sentiment dictionary. For example, many time references can theo-
retically relate to different temporal perspectives in different contexts or they can (explicitly or 
implicitly) refer to more than one temporal perspective at a time, as is the case in temporal 
comparisons such as “der SVR ist heute optimistischer als im Vorjahr“ (today, the GCEE is 
more optimistic than last year).47 For every entry, the specific context was checked before it 
was included it in the dictionary, resulting in 93 future- and 220-past-related-terms (basic 
forms).48 Finally, to study the references to individual Council members, I searched the corpus 
 
44 All identifiable instances of such false positives were removed. 
45 Another potential problem relates to OCR quality, which, in general, is sufficiently high, but which might less 
sufficient when it comes to numbers. 
46 That is, terms that account for at least 0.04 percent of the corpus. 
47 Comparisons can also be implicit, such as “inzwischen hat sich die Situation gebessert” (in the meantime, the 
situation has improved), which implicitly refers to the past while explicitly referring to the present. 
48 The list is available upon request. A more precise but also much more complex approach would be to capture 
word tenses. 
11 
for the surnames of current and former Council members, checking the results for false positives 
due to common names such as “Kurt Schmidt”.49 
3. The Macro Level: Economists in (Inter-)National Press Coverage 
Before we immerge ourselves in the details of the news coverage about the GCEE, this section 
will consider a more general, comparative perspective. In Figure 1, the proportion of interna-
tional newspaper articles mentioning economists is compared to the proportion of articles men-
tioning historians and scientists.50 In general, we can observe a steady increase for all three 
groups after World War II, reflecting the growing importance of scientific expertise in “knowl-
edgeable society”.51 Although it is difficult to compare the absolute level of coverage between 
newspapers due to differences in their databases,52 we can still observe differences in the dia-
chronic development of coverage. While economists outpaced historians in The New York 
Times (NYT) and The Washington Post (WP) quite early on in the 1960s, this happened only 
recently in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) and Die Zeit. Economists and historians 
received nearly the same level of media attention in The Guardian and The Times. Both of these 
papers display, in general, more constant levels of references to economists, historians, and 
scientists. Taken together, the overall impression is that economists rapidly gained attention in 
the middle of the 20th century, although this development was not, as the results for historians 
and scientists indicate, a feature specific to economists. Rather, the development is a general 
one that reflects society’s growing dependence on experts.53 
 
49 In other words, this measured how often the GCEE is mentioned together with one or several of its current or 
former members. Naturally, the question then arises as to how often Council members are mentioned without any 
reference to the Council. It would be interesting to know whether the frequency of references to individuals change 
after their appointment to the GCEE. Unfortunately, this information could not be collected as checking whole 
newspaper collections for false positives was not feasible. 
50 The search term “economist” might include references to the weekly newspaper. In a 2015 article, the New York 
Times journalist Justin Wolfers performed a similar comparison. See Wolfers (2015). 
51 Lane (1966). 
52 There might be differences in the way providers have digitized the newspapers. For example, some providers 
include items such as advertisements, while others do not. Consequently, when calculating the proportions of 
articles containing a search term, the reference values might vary. 
53 See, e.g., Eyal (2019) and Weingart (2005). 
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Percentage of articles containing at least one occurrence of the terms “historian” / “Historiker”, “economist” / 
“Volkswirt” / “Ökonom”, and “scientist” / “Wissenschaftler”, including inflections. German keywords also include 
compositions such as “Diplomvolkswirt” and female equivalents. Three-year centered moving averages. 
Sources: author’s own calculations based on data from FAZ Biblionet, Digitales Wörterbuch der Deutschen Spra-































































































































































































































































































































































































































Of course, a simple reference to “economists” or “historians” is a rather crude measure of their 
visibility, as, for the most part, it probably only shows how often journalists refer to these groups 
in an abstract way.54 If, instead, we focus on specific economic institutions and think tanks (see 
Figure 2), we get a more detailed picture that looks significantly different to the on depicted in 
Figure 1. For the US, both the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) and the National Bureau 
of Economic Research (NBER) experienced a dramatic increase in newspaper coverage after 
the 1950s. This reflected the tremendous success of economists becoming the “queen of the 
social sciences” after World War II in a period that has sometimes been called “the economists’ 
hour”.55 However, journalists focused less on the CEA and the NBER during the late 
1970s/early 1980s, at least in the case of NYT and WP.56 For economic institutions in Germany, 
there is a strikingly similar development. If we look at the proportion of articles mentioning one 
of the major economic research institutes, namely the Deutsche Institut für 
Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), the ifo Institut (ifo), the Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW), or the 
Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI, formerly Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für 
Wirtschaftsforschung), we can observe a similar pattern which also replicates at the level of 
individual newspapers, in this case FAZ and Zeit. Regarding individual institutes, the ifo clearly 
takes the lead, showing both the greatest increase and the strongest decline in media attention. 
Nevertheless, the three other institutes show a similar though less pronounced development. 
The GCEE, which was founded in 1963 during the heyday of economic policy advice,57 also 
experienced a steady decline in media attention from the 1980s onwards. However, just like the 
research institutes, the Council experienced a renewed media interest around the year 2000,58 
which I will discuss later in this paper. In general, the decline is much more gradual in Germany 
than in the US.59 At this point, however, it seems fair to say that, in contrast to the abstract 
references to economists, mentions of specific economic policy institutions had disappeared 
 
54 Then again, the keyword search for both terms might also include references to specific individuals, such as in 
“the economist Milton Friedman claims that...”. 
55 There are two books carrying this title, one in English and one in German. See Appelbaum (2019) and Nütze-
nadel (2005). 
56 The UK based Times naturally mentioned both institutions to a much lesser extent. 
57 Nützenadel (2002), Helmstädter (1988), Metzler (2004; 2002), Schanetzky (2007). 
58 For WP, data is available until the year 2003. In the case of NYT, which provides data until 2015, a comeback 
cannot be observed. 
59 Things are somewhat different for Germany’s central bank. The Deutsche Bundesbank has a constant level of 
high media coverage, with a spike in the early 1990s, which can be attributed to the establishment of the European 
Monetary Union. Afterwards, references to the Bundesbank start to fall, with the European Central Bank taking 
its place both in terms of political influence and of in terms of media attention. 
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from newspapers by the 1980s, although there was a distinct revival in the German media 
around the year 2000. 













Notes: a-e: Percentage of articles containing at least one reference to the institution in question, including both 
full names and abbreviations. a: New York Times and Washington Post; b – e: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
and Die Zeit; b: slash equals OR operator; c and d: articles mentioning DIW, ifo, IfW, or RWI; f: articles from 
Table 1, rr = report-related artciles, i.e. articles published in a three-week-window after publication of a GCEE 
annual report. Three-year centered moving averages. Sources: author’s own calculations based on data from 
GALE, FAZ Biblionet, and Digitales Wörterbuch der Deutschen Sprache, Handelsblatt, Spiegel, and Wirtschafts-
woche. 
 
How can this difference between references to economists in general (type 1) and to specific 
economic research institutions (type 2) be explained? First of all, the increase in type 1 refer-
ences coincides with the sharp decline of type 2 references. In other words, during the 1970s 
and 1980s, we can observe a shift from very specific references to concrete institutions of eco-
nomic expertise towards a more diffused style of referring to economists, which confirms the 
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example, by Michael Bernstein.60 But what does the increase in type 1 references actually im-
ply? To answer this question, it might be helpful to contemplate what the subject of type 1 
references might actually be. They most likely relate either to an amorphous group of econo-
mists or to specific individuals, as in “Economists are warning that...” (type 1.a), or to specific 
individuals, as in “As Adam Smith, chief economist at Royal Bank of Edinburgh, pointed out...” 
(type 1.b). In the second case, one must also consider the difference between academic and non-
academic economists, with the latter working, for example, in the finance industry. In the case 
of Australia, Alex Millmow and Jerry Courvisanos found that it is indeed the second group of 
economists which is most visible in the media, whereas academic economists are rather reluc-
tant in this regard.61 If we assume this “division of labor” also applies to the countries studied 
in this paper, we come to the following hypothesis: Depending on which type of reference (1.a 
or 1.b) predominates, the shift from type 2 to type 1 implies that references have either become 
more superficial or that specific individuals, especially those working in the private sector, have 
become more important. Without access to the full texts of those articles containing type 1 
references, however, it is difficult to reach a definitive conclusion. Based on the evidence pro-
vided in the case study that follows, however, it seems fair to say that news stories have become 
both more superficial and more focused on individual economists. 
To sum-up at this point, we can say that the success story of post-war economics was connected 
to the high level of media visibility specific bodies of economic expertise, such as the CEA in 
the US and the GCEE in Germany, enjoyed during this period. During the 1970s and 1980s, 
these institutions suffered a sharp decrease in visibility; the media started to refer to unspecific 
“economists”, a fact supporting Bernstein’s observation that economists “find themselves once 
again being ignored”62, at least by the media. However, three questions, if not more, remain to 
be answered: What are the specifics of the news stories hidden behind the aforementioned fig-
ures? What happened during the 1970s and 1980s that could explain the change in media per-
ception of economists? And what happened during the early 2000s in Germany, when the media 
once again paid more attention to economists? 
 
60 Bernstein (2001). For Germany, a similarly pessimistic perspective is provided by Schanetzky (2007). 
61 Millmow and Courvisanos (2007). 
62 Bernstein (2001, 191). 
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4. The Micro Level: The Case of the GCEE 
The evidence presented in Figures 1 and 2 shows some clear long-term similarities between 
Germany and the US, suggesting that during the late 1970s and the early 1980s, public attitude 
towards economists changed in both countries. Yet, these figures demand a closer examination, 
for at least two reasons: first, these results are based on the analysis of just two newspapers for 
each respective country; second, they tell us nothing about the actual newspaper content. To 
gain a more detailed understanding of the stories connected to economists, I will concentrate 
on the GCEE in the remainder of this paper. To this end, I both broadened the data base and 
intensified the analysis by focusing on newspaper content. The first step was to analyze the 
newspaper corpus presented in Table 1. Its development over time is presented in Figure 2.f. 
(above). In this case, the 1980s and the late 1990s stand out again as periods of change. This 
concerns both the general news coverage of the GCEE, as well as those articles which are pub-
lished in the three-week window after the release of a GCEE annual report (referred to as rr-
articles in the following). 
4.1 Topics 
Applying a topic model to the GCEE corpus gives us an impression of the content of newspaper 
coverage of the GCEE. As described in Section 2, I created a model consisting of 95 topics, 
most of which exhibit a high degree of coherence. Only five topics do not generate any inter-
pretable meaning and were therefore dropped in the further analysis. The other 90 topics were 
labeled and then aggregated into 15 higher-level categories which I have called “main topics”. 
An overview of all relevant individual and main topics is presented as a treemap in Figure 3, 
with box sizes corresponding to how frequently a topic appeared in the corpus, that is, the re-
spective topic share. 
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Figure 3 Topic Overview 
 
1: News Speak 1 
2: News Speak 2 
3: News Speak 3 
4: Stability Policy 
5: Industrial Policy 
6: Businesses 1 
7: Economy & Society 
8: Fiscal Stimuli 
9: Concerted Action 
10: Capital Markets 
11: Inequality 
12: Energy 




17: Real Estate Market 
18: Public Opinion 
19: Deregulation 
20: General Politics 
21: Reform Speak 
22: Overall Development 1 
23: Crisis 
24: Overall Development 2 
25: Industry 









35: People 1 
36: Consumer Prices 
37: Oil Price 
38: Monetary Theory 
39: Unemployment 





44: Social Partners 
45: Employees 
46: Wage Disputes 
47: Minimum Wage 
48: Working Time 
49: National Debt 
50: Fiscal Policy 1 
51: Corporate Taxation 
52: Public Budget 
53: Federalism 
54: Fiscal Policy 2 
55: Public Service 
56: Municipalities 
57: Star Economists 
58: Theory/Reviews 
59: Research Institutes 
60: Social Market Economy 
61: Demand Policy 
62: Economics 






69: The World 
70: European Integration 
71: US 







79: Female Members 
80: Rürup 
81: Euro Crisis 
82: Banking Crisis 
83: Financial Institutes 
84: People 2 
85: People 3 
86: Pension Insurance 
87: Health Insurance 
88: Nursing Insurance 
89: Relations 
90: Monetary Union 
Notes: Box sizes correspond to topic shares. I realigned topic numbers, which are assigned arbitrarily by the 
model, in order to provide a better overview. Topics 91-95 were identified as not containing interpretable mean-
ing. 
 
This figure clearly illustrates that media coverage of the GCEE consists of a variety of topics, 
not just economic development or forecast. This latter subject, which falls under the main topic 















































































However, the model identified a high number of other topics, many of which are equally sig-
nificant. For example, Monetary Policy amounts to almost the same topic share (9.6 percent), 
with Job Market (8.2 percent) and Public Finance (7.1 percent) following close behind. As 
opposed to these content-related main topics, two of the largest main topics – News Speak and 
Policy Speak – consist of topics which represent the use of a certain type of language specific 
to news and politics, respectively. The category Policy Speak together with the main topic Pol-
itics (4.9 percent) illustrate that coverage of the GCEE takes place frequently in a political con-
text and often mentions the Federal Government explicitly. In fact, the term “Bundesregierung” 
(Federal Government) can be found in 38 percent of all articles, suggesting that journalists per-
ceive the Council’s expertise to be directed primarily at the Federal Government, a fact which 
is also reflected in common expressions such as “Der Sachverständigenrat der Bundesregier-
ung” (the government’s council).63 The main topic Single Topics is a residual category and 
consists of those topics which could not be assigned to any of the other main topics. This main 
topic, alongside other main topics, shows that journalists referred to the GCEE not only in terms 
of broad economic themes but also relating to rather particular issues. Interestingly, topics re-
lated to international subjects ony account for a rather small amount of the corpus (4.2 percent), 
at least when compared to the other main topics. Economics is the umbrella title for topics 
relating to the discipline, including topics on economic theories and reviews (topic 58) and on 
the opinions of certain “star economists” (topic 57), to provide just two examples. People (2.8 
percent) groups together articles on biographical topics, reporting, for example, on an appoint-
ment to a certain committee. Topics which touch the Council itself fall into the category GCEE 
(3.8 percent). These topics mostly consist of references to well-known Council members, such 
as Bert Rürup, Olaf Sievert, and Wolfgang Stützel. Here, we can observe the importance of 
individual economists, a topic which will be addressed explicitly later on. There is also a special 
topic on female Council members (topic 79), the first mention of which coincided with Beatrice 
Weder di Mauro being appointed as the first woman on the Council in 2004. The remaining 
main topics – Financial Crisis, Social Security, and Eastern / Western Germany – only account 
 
63 Although the Council members are nominated by the Federal Government, there are at least two reasons why 
this perception is nevertheless biased. First, in contrast to the CEA, the GCEE is fully independent of any political 
guidelines. Second, the Federal Government is merely one part of the Council’s target audience, which is defined 
rather broadly as “all authorities responsible for economic policy as well as the general public” (Article 1 Act on 
the Appointment of a Council of Experts on Economic Development). Information on how the Council is orga-
nized can be found on its website https://www.sachverstaendigenrat-wirtschaft.de/en/about-us/objectives.html 
(last accessed January 20, 2021). 
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for rather low proportions of the corpus (3.0, 2.6, and 1.2 percent, respectively). This is due to 
the fact that all three topics are, due to their content, only prevalent for relatively short periods. 
Having gained an impression of which topics feature in news coverage of the GCEE, the next 
logical question is how these main topics have developed over time. To answer this question, I 
analyzed the mean topic shares for all articles published in a given year at the main topic level 
(Figure 4). These time series show that newspaper coverage has changed tremendously over 
the years. In the first decade, Monetary Policy was the dominant theme, which coincides with 
the turmoil of the Bretton Woods system in the late 1960s and early 1970s, as well as the high 
inflation rates during these years. The decrease in the rate of inflation from the mid 1970s made 
this topic obviously less attractive to journalists, at least in their reports on the GCEE. For Job 
Market, we can also observe that the topic shows a similar development to that of its corre-
sponding macroeconomic variable. When unemployment started to rise after the first oil price 
shock, this topic became more important, and more or less follows the fluctuations in the un-
employment rate in the following decades. Compared to its peak in the 1970s, however, the 
prevalence of this topic falls to a lower level during the 1980s and 1990s, which is particularly 
surprising in light of the fact that unemployment became a persistent problem in these decades. 
Indeed, the decline in media visibility during these decades can be directly linked to this topic. 
As I will discuss in Section 4.5, many journalists came to view the GCEE as obsolete in these 
years as it was seen as being unable to provide solutions for the most pressing topic of the 
time.64 Simultaneously, Economic Development shows a continuous increase until the late 
1980s, reaching a maximum of a 20 percent topic share in 1986. Apparently, journalists were 
still inclined to report on the Councils’ assessments of the economic situation despite their ra-
ther negative view of the GCEE. During the 1990s and 2000s, though, the interest in this main 
topic decreased continuously, in the end amounting to just seven percent in 2015. The category 
Politics closely follows the general development of the Council’s media attention, suggesting 
that the latter correlates with the political constellations in government; generally speaking, 
media attention was highest at times when the Federal Government was led by the Social Dem-
ocrats. For Public Finance, we can observe a continuous increase, which accelerated between 
2001 und 2005 when persistent German budget deficits culminated in an excessive deficit pro-
cedure against the Federal Republic.65 When deficits started to decline after 2005, mentions of 
the main topic dropped rapidly, suggesting that interest in public finance waned. As the main 
 
64 See below. 
65 Buchmüller and Marte (2004) and Ullmann (2005). 
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topic Social Security is connected to the subject of public finance, it shows a similar develop-
ment, although to a lesser extent. Moreover, this main topic only appears after the mid-1990s, 
as it was only then that the Council started to regularly include the social security system in its 
reports. The main topic GCEE shows a similar development to the general media visibility, 
which is plausible as this topic can be regarded as an indicator of the extent to which news 
reports deal with the Council. German Reunification, which falls under the main topic Eastern 
& Western Germany, obviously caught the attention of journalists only for a short time, at least 
as far as articles mentioning the GCEE are concerned. This is somewhat surprising, as the 
Council studied the economic development of the former GDR well into the early 2000s.66 
Additionally, it must be noted that, at the main topic level, press coverage closely follows the 
Council’s agenda.67 In turn, both the Council and its news coverage mirror the dominant eco-
nomic topics of the time. This becomes particularly evident in the main topic Financial Crisis, 
which covers both the financial crisis of 2007/2008 and the eurozone’s subsequent debt crisis. 
Figure 4 Topic Development 
  
 
Notes: three-year centered moving averages. Source: author’s own calculations. 
 
 
66 See, e.g., GCEE annual report 2004/2005. 






1965 1975 1985 1995 2005 2015
News Job market





1965 1975 1985 1995 2005 2015
Public finance Welfare state









This brief outline of news topics shows that the coverage of the GCEE largely follows the main 
current events, but also includes some rather specific topics. But what can we say about the way 
these topics are framed, or, more generally, about the tone of articles referring to the GCEE? 
Regarding news sentiment in this particular case, both a negative and a positive tonality seem 
equally plausible, although it is likely that journalists refer to the Council when there is a prob-
lem for which economic expertise is needed, thus leading to a higher prevalence of negative 
sentiment.68 To shed light on this aspect, I conducted a dictionary-based sentiment analysis on 
the GCEE corpus, differentiating between general articles and rr-articles, that is, articles pub-
lished in the three-week-window following the publication of a GCEE annual report. For this 
analysis, I relied on the sentiment dictionary provided by Bannier et al. (hereafter BPW). This 
dictionary was created for finance-related documents, a field with close parallels to the articles 
studied in this paper. To provide a comparison, I also applied the more general language dic-
tionary by Remus et al. (hereafter  SentiWS).69 If we compute the overall sentiment score for 
the whole GCEE corpus, we have a slightly negative value of -0.7 for BPW and a positive value 
of 3.9 for SentiWS, which confirms Bannier et al.’s observation that SentiWS produces overly 
positive sentiment scores in a business-related context. Both sentiment scores, despite their dif-
ferent absolute level, show a similar development over time (Pearson correlation: 0.64), again 
confirming a similar result to that described by Bannier et al. In other words, although both 
dictionaries produce different absolute levels of tonality, the development over time is similar. 
As the BPW dictionary is more context specific and the resulting negative sentiment more plau-
sible in this particular setting, I will rely on the BPW results in the following.70 
 
68 Furthermore, negative events such as natural disasters, terrorist attacks, scandals, or commercial frauds seem to 
have higher news value than positive stories, which would, in general, suggest a higher prevalence of negative 
tonality in the news. 
69 Bannier, Pauls, and Walter (2019), Remus, Quasthoff, and Heyer (2010). To allow for a more direct comparison 
of both dictionaries, I transformed the continuous SentiWS sentiment values into a binary scale. In both cases, the 
sentiment score s of document d was calculated as: 𝑠! =
"!#$!
%!
∗ 100 where pd is the sum of all positive terms, nd 
is the sum of all negative terms, and td is the overall number of tokens in document d. In order to fine tune the 
results of the dictionary approach, one could include so-called valence shifters and intensifiers, that is, words that 
alter the a priori sentiment values of a term. For example, the word “good” might have the a priori score of +1, 
which could be changed into -1 in case of “not good” or +2 in case of “very good”. Including such terms only had 
a marginal impact on the sentiment scores, which is why I have only provided the results from the baseline analysis. 
70 The BPW dictionary also provides a means to measure the degree of uncertainty expressed in a text. Applying 
this sub-dictionary on the GCEE corpus reveals a slight decrease in the proportion of uncertainty-related words 
from the late 1970s until around 2005, with a slight increase afterwards. At only 0.4 percentage points, the range 
between minimum and maximum is rather small, however, suggesting that change in the level of uncertainty ex-
pressed in the corpus is only minimal. 
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Main topic Score  Main topic Score  
Financial Crisis -10,4 Policy Speak -6,8 
News Speak -9,7 International -4,5 
Politics -9,0 Single Topics -4,4 
Social Security -9,0 Economics -4,2 
Job Market -8,6 GCEE -4,1 






Public Finance -7,4 People -1,4 
Monetary Policy -7,3   
 
Notes: sentiment scores based on the dictionary by Bannier et. al (2018). Panel A: all articles = complete corpus 
as described in Table 1; rr = report-related artciles, i.e. articles published in a three-week-window after the 
publication of a GCEE annual report. Three-year centered moving averages. Panel B: sentiment scores accord-
ing to procedure described in footnote 71. Sources: author’s own calculations. 
 
We can make several observations about the sentiment development depicted in Panel A in 
Figure 5. First, rr-articles seem to exhibit a slightly more negative tone than the overall corpus, 
especially up until the mid-1980s and after the year 2000. Furthermore, sentiment in these arti-
cles is more volatile than in the overall corpus, with high volatility persisting even after applying 
moving averages. Second, the sentiment score seems to develop in waves, especially for the 
total corpus. Between the early 1970s and early 1980s, articles are more negative in tone, be-
coming more positive during the 1980s. This is plausible: as we have seen in the previous sec-
tion, the media mainly focused on economic development in this period, which was rather pos-
itive, at least in terms of GDP growth. This is confirmed if we look at the sentiment scores of 
the main topics Economic Development in Figure 5 Panel B. As the dominant topic in the 1980s, 
its sentiment score is almost the least negative.71 After 1990, sentiment becomes increasingly 
negative until the early 2000s, which suits the rather depressed general economic climate of 
this period.72 Here, in particular, the effect of the economic and social burdens of German Re-
unification is clear and is mirrored in the rather negative sentiment score for the main topic 
Eastern & Western Germany. Generally, this negative tonality can be regarded as one explana-
tion for the relatively low media attention the GCEE received during this period. The increase 
 
71 Main topic sentiment was calculated in a two-step approach. First, articles were grouped according to their 
largest main topic. Then, sentiment scores were determined for each of these groups. Theoretically, sentiment can 
also be implemented directly in the topic modelling process. See, e.g., Nguyen and Shirai (2015). 
72 Berghoff (2019), Czada (2002). For example, many of the business climate indices provided by the ifo institute 
show a significant decline up until the early 2000s. The same holds true for the “Neujahrsumfrage” (new year 
survey) conducted by the Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach, which measures how many people are optimistic 
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in media attention after 2002 is accompanied by the articles again becoming more positive. 
After 2007, however, sentiment turned negative once more. This is directly linked to the finan-
cial crisis, and it is unsurprising that the corresponding main topic has the most negative senti-
ment score. 
Finally, it is necessary to explain the rather negative sentiment score of the main topic News 
Speak. The three individual topics grouped under this main topic all demonstrate fairly abstract 
language patterns, which are characteristic for a certain journalistic style of writing. The some-
what negative sentiment can be explained by the results of topic 3 (see Figure 6). At a first 
glance, it can be difficult to understand what this topic is about, but upon closer inspection, it 
becomes evident that the words contained in this topic belong to a language pattern that is used 
to describe someone’s critical attitude towards something or someone else. The high incidence 
of the term Bundesregierung suggests that this topic was generated as a result from news stories 
reporting on a conflict between the Federal Government and some other third party, in particular 
the GCEE. Interestingly, there is a more or less continuous increase in the prevalence of this 
topic between the mid-1980s and the late 2000s, indicating that this kind of conflict-related 
news story became increasingly popular. In general, conflicts between the GCEE and the Fed-
eral Government, whether they are real or just conjecture, seem to have a much higher news 
value than cases where the Council approves of the government’s course of action or policies. 
Figure 6 Topic 3 
  
Notes: three-year centered moving averages. Sources: author’s own calculations. 
 
4.3 Temporal Orientation 
Economists provide expertise on the past, the present, and the future, for example on topics 
such as general economic development, unemployment, or foreign trade. But which temporal 
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for economists: it depends. The two panels in Figure 7 show two different approaches to meas-
uring the temporal perspective of the articles. While Panel A depicts the prevalence of numer-
ical year references, for example “in 1967, GDP grew by 2.5 percent”, Panel B represents verbal 
time references, such as “last year, GDP grew by 2.5 percent”.73 If we take numerical dates as 
a basis, we find that 53 percent of all dates in the overall corpus refer to the past. Only 28 
percent and 18 percent relate to the future and present, respectively. In rr-articles, on the other 
hand, 50 percent of all time references are to the future, whilst 31 percent are to the past and 19 
percent are to the present. As far as the news stories about these reports are concerned, journal-
ists seem to be more interested in what is to come than in what has already happened. The 
observation that rr-articles are more future-oriented than the overall corpus is also confirmed 
by an analysis of verbal time references. In this case, there is a 57/43 percent split between past- 
and future-related terms in the total corpus, and a 50/50 split for rr-articles. 
Furthermore, both indices show similar developments over time, which aligns with the general 
development of the GCEE’s visibility in the media. When media attention dropped in the 1980s, 
coverage started to concentrate on topics related to general economic development, which was 
accompanied by a shift towards the future, particularly for news pieces on to GCEE reports but 
also for general coverage. As a result, news coverage in the 1980s focused increasingly on 
economic development, was less negative in tone, and was more aligned to the future than 
before. When media attention started to increase shortly after the year 2000, the opposite pro-
cess occurred, resulting in quite a pronounced shift towards the past. Interestingly, time refer-
ences to the present, that is, the year when an article was published, show a constant decline, 
both for the entire corpus and for rr-articles.74 
 
73 Positive values in Panel B indicate that articles contain more future-related than past-related terms, whilst neg-
ative values indicate that articles contain less future-related than past-related terms. 
74 It should be noted that, while the number of verbal time references per article is generally constant (8.7 words 
per 1,000 tokens for the overall corpus; 9.7 for rr-articles), the number of numerical year references declined. 
Between 1965 and 1974 there were, on average, 4.4 year references per 1,000 tokens for the overall corpus (4.6 
for rr-articles), dropping to 3.2 (2.7) references between 2005 and 2014. 
25 





Notes: all articles = complete corpus as described in Table 1; rr = report-related artciles, i.e. articles published in 
a three-week-window after the publication of a GCEE annual report. Three-year centered moving averages. 
Sources: author’s own calculations. 
 
4.4 Individuals 
Any good story must have either a compelling or an unappealing protagonist. So far, the anal-
ysis has treated the GCEE as the main protagonist, but the newspaper corpus studied in this 
section also includes articles which only mention individual Council members.75 To quantify 
the role of these individuals, I searched the corpus for names of – active or former – members. 
In total, 49 percent of all articles contain a reference to at least one Council member, while 51 
percent contain no mention whatsoever. If we look at the development of these percentages, we 
can see that the number of articles with no references (black line in Figure 8) declines steeply 
during the 1980s, while those containing at least one name (dotted line) develop rather differ-
ently. Here, the spike in mentions of individual Council members at the end of the 1960s can 
 
75 In these cases, references to the GCEE regularly take the form of “Professor X, member of the GCEE, said 
that…”. The role of individual members is also stressed by Bernstein, according to whom the CEA’s high public 
reputation during the early 1960s is also explained by the prominence of its members, in this case, Kermit Gordon, 
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be explained by an internal dispute involving several Council members, which was widely dis-
cussed by the media. Indeed, the GCEE’s history is also a history of its internal conflicts, which 
were regularly taken up by the media and each of which tarnished the Councils’ reputation to 
varying degrees.76 
Figure 8 Name References 
 
Topic 57 Star Economists 
     
Note: articles with/without references to current or former GCEE members by name, per 1,000 GCEE articles. 
Articles containing at least one reference as a proportion of all GCEE articles. Three-year centered moving av-
erages. Sources: author’s own calculations. 
 
As we have already seen, the GCEE, as well as other bodies of economic expertise, experienced 
something of a “comeback” in the late 1990s and early 2000s. This revival was accompanied, 
or was maybe caused by, an increasing media interest in individual economists. Although all 
three lines in Figure 8 increase at the time in question, the rise in the number of “personalized” 
 
76 The media furor surrounding Wolfgang Stützel, who resigned after internal quarrels regarding the question 
whether the D-Mark should be revalued, was the first of a sequence of disputes between Council members. After 
his resignation, Stützel and other Council members continued their dispute via guest articles in different newspa-
pers, causing negative publicity. This first scandal is also reflected in topic 77. There is no room here to describe 
all of these conflicts in detail. Aside from the conflicts mentioned above and below, which are the scandals that 
had the largest impact on the GCEE’s reputation, there have been at least two more media furors. In both cases, 
members – Werner Glastetter in 1981 and Ernst Helmstädter in 1988 – left the Council due to strained relations 
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stories is much greater than of the number of no-reference articles. This finding is particularly 
obvious if we look at the proportion of articles mentioning a member (grey line in Figure 7), 
which increases continuously form the 1980s onwards and surges in the period around the year 
2000. This indicates that the media became more interested in individual Council members, an 
interest which is reflected in journalists frequently writing portraits of Council members in 
which their backgrounds and their viewpoints, such as on their favorite books, are described.77 
Of the GCEE members, this hype surrounding economists primarily concerned Bert Rürup, 
who acted as chairman between 2005 and 2009 and who can, arguably, be regarded as the 
Council’s media star. With almost 27 percent of all articles mentioning the GCEE that were 
published during his term of office (2000-2009) also mentioning Rürup, the “man on all chan-
nels”78 is by far the most frequently referenced member of the GCEE. For comparison, the 
Council member in second place is Herbert Giersch, with mentions in “only” in 15.7 percent of 
all GCEE articles published during his term of office (1964-1970).79 Likewise, other Council 
members in the post-2000 years, namely, Peter Bofinger, Wolfang Franz, Beatrice Weder di 
Mauro, and Wolfgang Wiegard, attracted high levels of media attention, in part but not solely 
because of frictions between individuals occurring in the public eye. Indeed, this conflict, which 
culminated in early 2005, marked the end of the Council’s media comeback and resulted once 
again in rather negative publicity which, as opposed to the negative publicity about previous 
conflicts, tarnished the Council’s reputation for several years.80 Finally, in addition to the afore-
mentioned topics, this focus on individuals is also mirrored in topic 57, which likewise indicates 
a growing importance of individual (star) economists. 
4.5 Turning points 
Based on the findings I have described so far, two periods stand out: the late 1970s/early 1980s 
and the early 2000s. Both periods concern the GCEE’s media history and economists’ media 
visibility in general. Although there is no room for a detailed account, I want at least to make 
 
77 Bröll (2005). Another vivid example of this interest in individual economists is provided by Braunberger (2005). 
78 “Der Mann auf allen Kanälen” was the title of a portrait published in the FAZ. See Germis (2002). 
79 If we take into account the fact that the media paid, in general, less attention to “celebrities” before the 1990s, 
we must regard Herbert Giersch – one of the GCEE’s founding members who was later appointed president of the 
Kiel Institute for the World Economy – as an early media star who regularly spoke through the media. See, e.g., 
his collected Wirtschaftswoche columns, which are published in Giersch (1986). Reference figures for all GCEE 
members (until 2015) can be found in the online appendix. 
80 This internal conflict arose after Bofinger’s appointment in 2004 and led to Wiegard publicly announcing his 
resignment from Council chair. See, e.g., Fickinger (2004), Fischer (2005), Neubacher (2005), Storbeck (2005), 
Welter (2005). 
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serval brief observations that add a little to the literature on these turning points and go beyond 
the arguments I have made so far. Essentially, both turning points mark fundamental shifts in 
how experts are perceived, and this shift also transfers to bodies of economic expertise such as 
the GCEE. To explain the first shift, I hypothesize that there was, apart from a general decline 
in public reception of expert authority,81 a problem that specifically concerned economists and 
that, among other reasons, caused the changes that I have described above. Based on extensive 
close reading of the articles contained in the GCEE corpus, it seems to me that the crucial point 
is that economists in general and the GCEE in particular were perceived as being incapable of 
providing solutions for the dominant economic problem of the time – unemployment – which 
led to a general distrust of economic expertise.82 While the economy slowly recovered from the 
second oil price shock, unemployment turned into a structural problem, with the number of 
unemployed persons surpassing the two-million level for the first time in 1983.83 This was ac-
companied by a rather pessimistic overall sentiment, both at the level of the economy and so-
ciety in general, at least at the beginning of the 1980s.84 All in all, this resulted in a rather critical 
attitude towards economists, which was expressed in numerous articles, many of which use 
terms such as “Ratlosigkeit”, “Hilflosigkeit”, or “Resignation” (helplessness, resignation) when 
describing economic experts.85 As the Spiegel put it: 
“The helplessness of the legions of economists can be seen in the fact that the solu-
tions offered by economic professionals are based either on the 200-year-old find-
ings of the classical economists or the 50-year-old findings of the English Lord 
Keynes.”86 
This critical attitude towards economic experts, especially concerning the GCEE, became par-
ticularly evident during the dispute on the reduction in working time in 1984/1985 (“35-
Stunden-Woche”), as many journalists who had supported the Council on this topic in the late 
1970s now criticized the GCEE for its firm rejection of a reduction in working time.87 
 
81 See, e.g., Weingart (2005; 1983). 
82 The following considerations are restricted to Germany, although they might, at least partially, also apply to 
economists in other countries. 
83 On the topic of unemployment in Germany during the 1970s and 1980s, see Raithel and Schlemmer (2009). 
84
 Hesse (2016, 475f), Esposito (2014), Radkau (2017, 335–42). A good example of this pessimism at the turn of 
the decade can be found in a series of Spiegel articles published in 1980 which were titled “Die fetten Jahre sind 
vorbei” (the good years are over). 
85 See, e.g., Kaden (1985), Kampe (1988; 1985), Piel (1982), Schmid (1987; 1985). 
86 Der Spiegel (1980); own translation, italics added. 
87 See Der Spiegel (1984a; 1984b; 1984c), Krüger (1984), Michaels (1984), Schmidt (1985). 
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Unemployment, however, was not the only reason why economists were perceived as lacking 
in competence. Rather, economics in general was, as the quote cited above shows, considered 
to be out-of-date. This general bashing of economists is particularly well-illustrated by two 
articles, the first of which was published in 1983 in the Wirtschaftswoche, and the second in 
1984 in the Spiegel.88 Both articles basically claimed that the then current state economics was 
obsolete, a narrative with some parallels to the discussion on the usefulness of economics which 
ignited after the financial crisis of 2007/2008, particularly in its reference the Great Depression 
of the 1930s. Although it is difficult to prove a clear causal relationship, it seems rather plausible 
that this negative image of economics as a discipline led to the decrease in the number of stories 
referring to economists observed in Section 3.89 
After approximately two decades of keeping aloof from the public eye and, in a sense, “working 
undercover”, economists once again stepped into the limelight at around the year 2000. Again, 
a shift in the general assessment of experts per se, coinciding with some specific economy-
related topics, might explain this shift in economists’ public image. The first point can be at-
tributed to a new policy style which was practiced by the new Schröder administration and 
particularly by the chancellor himself, who ensured he was frequently on stage with various 
experts.90 This policy style was characterized by a heavy reliance on publicly visible expert 
commissions, such as the Hartz, Rürup or Süssmuth committees. This process of – allegedly – 
delegating the identification of solutions to political issues to experts did not imply that these 
experts actually had more influence on politics, but rather that politicians gained the opportunity 
to justify their decisions. The number of advisory bodies actually declined, but, due to politi-
cians claiming to base their decisions on external expertise, media attention directed towards 
these experts grew rapidly, reaching a peak in the year 2000.91 Apparently, economists also 
profited from this increased awareness of institutions that advise policy, which also sparked a 
 
88 See Wirtschaftswoche (1983), Baron (1984). 
89 This argument is generally in line with Michael Bernstein’s, as well as Tim Schanetzky’s assessments, although 
they both tend to stress economists’ (perceived) failure to manage the economy and, thereby, their (perceived) 
failure in what Bernstein refers to as “statecraft” after the first oil price shock and the subsequent period of stag-
flation, which prevailing Keynesian economics had troubles explaining. See Bernstein (2001), Schanetzky (2007). 
Surely, this is a valid point which, together with the unsolved issue of unemployment, tarnished the reputation of 
economists. Yet we have to keep in mind that, in terms of political influence, economists, especially those pro-
moting the free market, were still quite influential, especially in the US and the UK. 
90 For a more detailed description of this topic, see Murswieck (2003), Thunert (2004), Siefken (2019; 2007), and 
Patzwald (2008). 
91 Siefken (2019). 
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large amount of research on the policy advice of economists and other experts.92 This specific 
policy style of reliance on experts boosted economists’ media visibility even more, as it was 
primarily targeted at a political field which fell into economists’ are of competence. After years 
of political stagnation, which are summarized by the German word “Reformstau” (reform back-
log), the Schröder administration launched several far-reaching reforms, known as Agenda 
2010, which aimed at fundamentally restructuring the welfare state. These reforms especially 
targeted the labor market and social security, and were intended to break up labor market rigid-
ities, to overcome persistent unemployment, and to trigger economic growth. Accordingly, eco-
nomic topics, such as social security, unemployment, and public finance, moved into the public 
eye, which, as we saw at the beginning of this section, was rather beneficial for the GCEE’s 
and other economists’ media visibility. 
5. Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to study the visibility of economists in the media, in order to evaluate 
whether economists, as it is sometimes claimed,93 actually have become silent in public dis-
course. To this aim, I conducted a systematic review of (print) media coverage of economists, 
both in terms of their quantitative media visibility and the specific features of news stories 
mentioning economists. First, I conducted a comparison of economists’ quantitative media vis-
ibility in international newspapers. Second, I presented a case study on the GCEE to provide a 
more close-up perspective of the characteristics of the way in which this institution is covered 
by the press. To sum up the main findings, I come to the following three conclusions: 1) Econ-
omists’ media visibility increased rapidly after World War II. Specific bodies of economic ex-
pertise, such as the CEA, the GCEE, and the NBER enjoyed increasing levels of media cover-
age. In the 1970s and early 1980s, however, the media visibility of these institutions decreased 
significantly, while the media started to refer more generally to “economists”. In case of Ger-
many, we can observe a comeback for economists in the late 1990s and early 2000s, when 
institutions such as the GCEE once again experienced higher media visibility. 2) Regarding the 
coverage of the GCEE, we have seen that the way in which journalists write about the Council 
has changed considerably since it was founded in the 1960s. Although news coverage touched 
 
92 The economic literature on this topic that was published in the early 2000s, however, was mostly based on 
anecdotal evidence from practitioners. One exception from this general observation is the work by Susanne Cassel. 
Recently, this topic has been taken up primarily by Justus Haucap. See, e.g., Cassel (2001), Haucap and Mödl 
(2013). 
93 Bernstein (2001). 
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on a wide range of topics, it predominantly followed the prevailing economic problems. The 
decrease in media visibility in the 1980s coincided with an increasing focus on economic de-
velopment, whereas the increase in media visibility at around the year 2000 was mainly asso-
ciated with news stories on public finance and the social security system. Both turning points 
also had an impact on news sentiment and temporal perspective. In short, articles became less 
pessimistic and more future-oriented during the 1980s and somewhat more pessimistic and 
more past-oriented after 2000. Furthermore, the increase in media visibility in the late 1990s 
was also driven by a growing focus on individual Council members. 3) Both the turning point 
of the 1980s and the turning point of the late 1990s can be regarded as broader shifts in how 
economic experts and experts in general are appraised, which resulted from changes in the per-
ception of how competent experts are at solving major societal issues. In general, the evidence 
provided in this paper does indeed support the claim that economists have become more silent 
than they were in the heyday of economic statecraft during the 1960s. The results, however, 
also show that the narrative of “everything was better in the old days” must be dismissed as too 
pessimistic. After all, if we accuse someone of being overly silent, we should first ask ourselves 
whether we are willing to listen in the first place.  
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Main topic Top 10 terms 
1: News Speak 1 5,5 News Speak gesamtwirtschaftlichen massnahmen sachverstaendigenrat be-
gutachtung oeffentlichen diskussion sachverstaendigenrates 
moeglichkeit hilfe system 
2: News Speak 2 5,1 News Speak deutsche politiker erfolg alte kampf politik republik geschichte 
stunde wahrheit 
3: News Speak 3 3,7 News Speak bundesregierung kritik vorsitzende forderte vorschlag warnte 
sprach ansicht sachverstaendigenrats sachverstaendigenrates 
4: Stability Policy 1,9 Single Topics bundesregierung regierung wirtschaftspolitik massnahmen 
bundesrepublik sachverstaendigenrates sachverstaendigen 
wirtschaftspolitischen stabilitaet wirtschafts 
5: Industrial Policy 1,5 Single Topics unternehmen wettbewerb markt industrie internationalen sub-
ventionen maerkte staatliche zukunft strukturwandel 
6: Businesses 1 1,3 Single Topics unternehmen firmen mitarbeiter branche industrie arbeits-
plaetze manager kunden unternehmer beschaeftigten 
7: Economy & So-
ciety 
0,9 Single Topics menschen gesellschaft sozialen freiheit bundesrepublik ord-
nung soziale demokratie solidaritaet system 
8: Fiscal Stimuli 0,8 Single Topics investitionen programm oeffentlichen massnahmen bundesre-




0,7 Single Topics aktion gewerkschaften konzertierten konzertierte dgb schiller 
unternehmer vetter gruppen arbeitgeber 
10: Capital 
Markets 
0,6 Single Topics aktien anleger boerse bank anleihen aktie kurse markt deutsche 
boersen 
11: Inequality 0,6 Single Topics einkommen vermoegen gesellschaft ungleichheit soziale armut 
reichen verteilung bevoelkerung menschen 
12: Energy 0,5 Single Topics kohle energien energie strom energiewende kernenergie ener-
giepolitik bergbau erneuerbaren eeg 
13: Higher 
Education 
0,4 Single Topics studenten hochschulen universitaeten universitaet forschung 
studiengebuehren studium professoren bwl fakultaet 
14: Law 0,4 Single Topics richter bundesverfassungsgericht grundgesetz urteil verfassung 
monopolkommission gesetze gericht karlsruhe grundgesetzes 
15: Families 0,3 Single Topics kinder eltern kindern familien frauen kind leyen bildung schue-
ler schulen 
16: Environment 0,3 Single Topics umwelt umweltpolitik oekologische oekologischen umwelt-
schutz oekosteuer wachstum bip wohlstand nachhaltigkeit 
17: Real Estate 
Market 
0,3 Single Topics wohnungen wohnungsbau bau investoren mieten immobilien 
wohnung markt preise nachfrage 
18: Public Opinion 0,3 Single Topics arbeitnehmer bevoelkerung vermoegensbildung hoffnungen in-
vestivlohn stimmung beteiligung allensbacher sparfoerderung 
vermoegenspolitik 
19: Reregulation 0,2 Single Topics sowjetunion verkehr bahn bundesrepublik nsu moskau bonner 
kilometer bundesbahn tonnen 
20: General 
Politics 
8,5 Policy Speak politik politische sachverstaendigenrat politischen aufgabe zu-
kunft politisch diskussion meinung FALSCH 
21: Reform Speak 2,0 Policy Speak politik reformen regierung reform bundesregierung wachstum 





wachstum sachverstaendigenrat investitionen konjunktur 
rueckgang privaten nachfrage unternehmen prognose real 
23: Crisis 2,6 Econonomic 
Development 
konjunktur wachstum rezession krise deutsche usa unterneh-





oekonomen deutsche bip volkswirte huether chefvolkswirt mi-
chael duesseldorf franz hess 
25: Industry 0,9 Econonomic 
Development 
industrie gewerbe produktion unternehmen maschinenbau aus-
land einzelhandel auftragseingaenge bundesbank auftraege 
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26: Businesses 2 0,6 Econonomic 
Development 
unternehmen investitionen gewinne kapital privaten gewinn un-
ternehmer sparen investieren ertraege 
27: Organizations 0,5 Econonomic 
Development 
stoltenberg industrie bdi bangemann rexrodt bundesverband 
roth deutsche bundeswirtschaftsminister diht 
28: Statistics 0,3 Econonomic 
Development 
statistik statistischen statistische bundesamt volkswirtschaftli-
chen gesamtrechnung statistiken informationen amtlichen 
volkswirtschaftliche 
29: Money 3,2 Monetary Policy geld buerger steuern menschen bezahlen sparen regierung bof-
inger finanzieren peter 
30: Inflation 1,3 Monetary Policy inflation preise bundesbank stabilitaet preissteigerungen rezes-
sion konjunktur konjunkturpolitik nachfrage preis 
31: ECB 1,0 Monetary Policy ezb zentralbank geldpolitik inflation europaeischen notenbank 
europaeische zinsen issing draghi 
32: Bundesbank 0,8 Monetary Policy bundesbank geldpolitik geldmenge zinsen geld notenbank mo-
netaeren pohl banken zentralbankgeldmenge 
33: Currency 0,8 Monetary Policy dollar wechselkurse waehrung d-mark waehrungen aufwertung 
internationalen wechselkurs abwertung waehrungssystem 
34: EMU 0,7 Monetary Policy waehrungsunion europaeischen stabilitaetspakt sanktionen de-
fizit laender stabilitaets pakt kriterien regeln 
35: People 1 0,6 Monetary Policy bundesbank weber weidmann axel praesident bundesbankprae-
sident jens frankfurt poehl geldpolitik 
36: Consumer 
Prices 
0,5 Monetary Policy preise verbraucher lebenshaltung landwirtschaft teurer agrarpo-
litik bauern verbraucherpreise nahrungsmittel ertl 




0,3 Monetary Policy koehler friedman schwankungen kreditpolitik monetary ge-
samtindikator oekonometrischen aktiva claus policy 
39: Unemployment 1,6 Job Market arbeitslosigkeit arbeitsplaetze beschaeftigung arbeit unterneh-
men arbeitsmarkt loehne nachfrage arbeitslosen produktivi-
taet 
40: Wage Policy 1,2 Job Market lohnpolitik gewerkschaften loehne arbeitnehmer lohnerhoehun-
gen lohn unternehmen produktivitaet tarifparteien sachversta-
endigenrat 
41: Unions 1,1 Job Market metall arbeitgeber gewerkschaften gewerkschaft tarifrunde 
streik forderung tarifpolitik gesamtmetall metallindustrie 
42: Reforms 1,1 Job Market arbeit arbeitslosengeld sozialhilfe arbeitsmarkt hartz jobs franz 
arbeitslose arbeitslosen menschen 
43: Unemployment 
Statistics 
0,7 Job Market arbeit arbeitsmarkt arbeitslosen arbeitslosigkeit bundesanstalt 




0,7 Job Market unternehmen arbeitnehmer gewerkschaften tarifautonomie ku-
endigungsschutz franz tarifvertrag arbeitgeber tarifparteien 
regelungen 
45: Employees 0,7 Job Market menschen arbeiten ausbildung jungen wandel arbeit junge ael-
teren unternehmen frauen 
46: Wage Disputes 0,6 Job Market unternehmer bundesrepublik gewerkschaften arbeitnehmer lo-




0,4 Job Market mindestlohn mindestloehne mindestlohns gesetzlichen arbeit-
nehmer stunde mindestloehnen einfuehrung loehne branche 
48: Working Time 0,3 Job Market arbeitszeitverkuerzung arbeitszeit stunden stunden-woche 
lohnausgleich verkuerzung wochenarbeitszeit arbeiten ar-
beitszeiten lucke 
49: National Debt 1,8 Public Finance ausgaben oeffentlichen bund schulden finanzpolitik haushalte 
investitionen neuverschuldung konsolidierung verschuldung 
50: Fiscal Policy 1 1,4 Public Finance steuern einkommen mehrwertsteuer einkommensteuer steuerre-





1,1 Public Finance unternehmen einkommensteuer reform gewinne koerperschaft-
steuer kapitalgesellschaften gewerbesteuer besteuerung unter-
nehmensbesteuerung steuern 
52: Public Budget 1,0 Public Finance eichel finanzminister waigel bund haushalt steuerschaetzung 
hans steuereinnahmen bundesfinanzminister einnahmen 
53: Federalism 0,7 Public Finance laender bund laendern bundeslaender bayern finanzausgleich 
reform baden-wuerttemberg laenderfinanzausgleich finanz-
kraft 
54: Fiscal Policy 2 0,5 Public Finance besteuerung steuer erbschaftsteuer peffekoven fiskus einkom-
men besteuert steuerfrei steuerlich erben 
55: Public Service 0,4 Public Finance oeffentlichen dienst beamten post beamte bund dienstes oef-
fentliche angestellten kluncker 
56: Municipalities 0,3 Public Finance kommunen gemeinden gewerbesteuer staedte kommunalen 
kommunale bund einkommensteuer staedtetag laender 
57: Star 
Economists 
1,3 Economics oekonomen sinn wirtschaftsforschung schmidt oekonom for-
scher fuest bofinger instituts diw 
58: Theory / 
Reviews 
1,0 Economics theorie buch oekonomie verlag wissenschaft oekonomischen 
wirtschaftspolitik autoren oekonomische praxis 
59: Research 
Institutes 
0,9 Economics institut prognosen institute wirtschaftsforschung diw prognose 




0,7 Economics marktwirtschaft erhard ludwig markt wirtschaftspolitik wettbe-
werb sozialen soziale hickel eucken 
61: Demand Policy 0,7 Economics wirtschaftspolitik nachfrage keynes angebotspolitik flassbeck 
geldpolitik arbeitslosigkeit politik nachfragepolitik konjunk-
turpolitik 
62: Economics 0,6 Economics wachstum bundesrepublik wachstums wirtschaftspolitik sozial-
produkt wachstumsrate vollbeschaeftigung wirtschaftswachs-
tum volkswirtschaftlichen sozialprodukts 
63: Policy Advice 0,6 Economics beratung wissenschaftlichen beirat wissenschaft wissenschaft-
ler wissenschaftliche politikberatung politik politischen poli-
tiker 
64: Merkel 1,6 Politics spd merkel union cdu koalition steinbrueck fdp angela csu re-
gierung 
65: Schröder 1,0 Politics schroeder spd kanzler gerhard lafontaine regierung bundes-
kanzler gruenen partei clement 
66: Schmidt/Kohl 1,0 Politics schmidt lambsdorff fdp spd kohl bonner helmut kanzler koali-
tion bundeskanzler 
67: Schiller/Strauß 0,7 Politics schiller strauss karl schillers wirtschaftsminister aufwertung 
brandt erhard kanzler minister 
68: Bundestag 0,6 Politics bundestag spd opposition koalition bundesrat bundesregierung 
fdp parlament regierung cdu 
69: The World 1,3 International usa bundesrepublik staaten deutsche laendern laender internati-
onalen vereinigten japan frankreich 
70: European 
Integration 
1,0 International europaeischen europa europaeische waehrungsunion gemein-
same union nationalen gemeinschaft laender mitgliedstaaten 
71: US 0,7 International usa dollar staaten amerikanischen amerikanische amerikaner 
vereinigten washington praesident amerika 
72: Foreign Trade 0,5 International ausland bundesrepublik aufwertung internationalen zahlungsbi-
lanz auslaendischen inland aussenwirtschaftlichen absiche-
rung aussenwirtschaftliche 
73: France 0,4 International frankreich franzoesischen franzoesische paris frankreichs fran-
zosen praesident hollande bruessel gipfel 
74: Switzerland 0,3 International schweiz schweizer fluechtlinge feld franken deutsche buerger 
oesterreich zuerich waehrungsreform 
75: Council 1,3 GCEE rat sachverstaendigenrat gutachten sachverstaendigen rates pro-
fessoren gesamtwirtschaftlichen wiegard begutachtung wirt-
schaftsweisen 
76: Individuals 1,0 GCEE universitaet professor giersch mitglied herbert donges hax 
koeln instituts juergen 
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77: Stützel 0,4 GCEE professor sievert stuetzel schaefer kloten giersch bauer olaf mit-
glied glastetter 
78: Siebert 0,4 GCEE siebert horst weltwirtschaft politik instituts praesident mitglied 
kiel volkswirtschaft kieler 
79: Female 
Members 
0,4 GCEE mauro frauen buch beatrice frau manager claudia fuehrungs-
kraefte schnabel aufsichtsrat 
80: Rürup 0,4 GCEE ruerup bert maschmeyer awd ruerups kommission darmstadt 
darmstaedter carsten berater 
81: Euro Crisis 1,6 Financial Crisis griechenland schulden spanien laender staaten europa krise ita-
lien staatsanleihen euro-zone 
82: Banking Crisis 1,0 Financial Crisis banken krise finanzkrise bank kredite bankenaufsicht finanzma-
erkte aufsicht regulierung eigenkapital 
83: Financial 
Institutes 
0,4 Financial Crisis bank banken sparkassen landesbanken deutsche frankfurt com-
merzbank bargeld dresdner kreditinstitute 
84: People 2 2,0 People mitarbeiter amt frau arbeit chef berater politik kollegen jaehrige 
nachfolger 
85: People 3 0,8 People hans praesident vorsitzender cdu karl vorstandsmitglied gmbh 
geschaeftsfuehrer chef dieter 
86: Pension 
Insurance 
1,3 Social Security rente rentenversicherung rentner alter gesetzlichen altersvor-
sorge beitraege ruerup riester arbeitnehmer 
87: Health 
Insurance 
0,8 Social Security kassen krankenversicherung krankenkassen versicherten ge-




0,5 Social Security pflegeversicherung leistungen bluem arbeitslosenversicherung 
beitraege sozialversicherung arbeitnehmer pflege sozialen ar-
beitgeber 
89: Relations 0,8 Eastern /Western 
Germany 
osten ostdeutschland westen bundeslaendern ost ostdeutschen 
westdeutschland laendern westdeutschen einheit 
90: Monetary 
Union 
0,4 Eastern / West-
ern Germany 
ddr bundesrepublik waehrungsunion schneider d-mark einheit 
wirtschafts kohl marktwirtschaft pohl 
91: Unknown 1 0,4 Unknown staatssekretaer wirtschaftsministerium ministerium airbus mi-
nister wirtschaftsminister industrie baden nordrhein spaeth 
92: Unknown 2 0,3 Unknown opel chef ausblick lufthansa franz bahn peter insolvenz gutten-
berg porsche 
93: Unknown 3 0,3 Unknown stadt region handwerk frankfurt darmstadt handwerksordnung 
landesregierung stuttgart ihk handwerks 
94: Unknown 4 0,2 Unknown vereine anda buehne verbaende springer journalisten schauspie-
ler urlaub landeswirtschaftsministerium chefredakteur 
95: Unknown 5 0,2 Unknown meyer dahrendorf planung phillips indexklauseln indexierung 
forstwirtschaft bestimmung privaten sparerschutzgemein-
schaft 
 
Figure A-1 Sentiment scores 
 
Notes: rr articles = articles published in a three-week window after the publication of a GCEE annual report. 
Three-year centered moving averages. Author’s own calculations based on dictionaries by Bannier et. al (2018), 
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Table A-2 References to Council Members in GCEE Corpus (1965-2015) 
Member Term of office 
# Articles mentioning member X 
Totala) 
During term of 
officeb) 
After term of 
office 
Rürup, Bert* 2000-09 1.273 (10,1%) 989 (26,9%) 261 
Giersch, Herbert 1964-70 383 (3,1) 127 (15,7) 256 
Feld, Lars P. since 2011 235(1,9) 225 (14,3) - 
Köhler, Claus 1969-74 164 (1,3) 112 (13,5) 47 
Bofinger, Peter 2004-19 650 (5,2) 612 (13,5) - 
Franz, Wolfgang 2* 2003-13 735 (5,9) 536 (13,1) 21 
Kloten, Norbert* 1969-76 192 (1,5) 153 (12,1) 34 
Krupp, Hans-Jürgen 1982-84 98 (0,8) 35 (12,0) 50 
Schneider, Hans Karl* 1982-92 240 (1,9) 192 (11,0) 47 
Pohl, Rüdiger 1986-94 242 (1,9) 175 (10,7) 62 
Schäfer, Manfred 1968-70 88 (0,7) 50 (10,5) 36 
Meyer, Fritz W. 1964-66 30 (0,2) 12 (10,4) 18 
Wiegard, Wolfgang* 2001-11 453 (3,6) 426 (10,4) 17 
Siebert, Horst 1991-03 411 (3,3) 325 (9,6) 65 
Buch, Claudia 2012-14 91 (0,7) 74 (9,1) 7 
Franz, Wolfgang 1 1994-99 735 (5,9) 110 (8,9) 66c) 
Schmidt, Christoph M.* 2009-2020 204 (1,6) 195 (8,5) - 
Hax, Herbert* 1989-00 256 (2,0) 220 (8,3) 31 
Peffekoven, Rolf 1991-01 278 (2,2) 199 (7,8) 77 
Wieland, Volker since 2013 110 (0,9) 62 (7,8) - 
Mertens, Dieter 1984-86 54 (0,4) 22 (7,6) 14 
Schnabel, Isabel 2014-2019 42 (0,3) 28 (7,2) - 
Bauer, Wilhelm* 1964-74 121 (1,0) 112 (6,9) 9 
Weder di Mauro, Beatrice 2004-12 282 (2,2) 215 (6,9) 54 
Donges, Juergen B.* 1992-02 274 (2,2) 182 (6,8) 76 
Glastetter, Werner 1979-81 62 (0,5) 17 (6,7) 41 
Gutowski, Armin 1970-78 121 (1,0) 80 (6,4) 34 
Sievert, Olaf* 1970-85 260 (2,1) 148 (6,4) 101 
Issing, Otmar 1988-90 148 (1,2) 26 (6,0) 113 
Helmstädter, Ernst 1983-88 122 (1,0) 48 (5,9) 67 
Kromphardt, Jürgen 1999-04 141 (1,1) 99 (5,8) 18 
Koch, Harald 1964-69 64 (0,5) 36 (5,7) 28 
Fels, Gerhard 1976-82 103 (0,8) 47 (5,5) 54 
Stützel, Wolfgang 1966-68 144 (1,1) 20 (5,1) 124 
Albach, Horst 1978-83 56 (0,4) 30 (4,2) 22 
Binder, Paul 1964-68 29 (0,2) 18 (4,1) 11 
Weber, Axel 2002-04 206 (1,6) 34 (4,0) 167 
Scherhorn, Gerhard 1974-79 40 (0,3) 25 (3,3) 12 
Hesse, Helmut 1985-88 47 (0,4) 21 (2,9) 24 
Pohmer, Dieter 1984-91 49 (0,4) 36 (2,9) 11 
Schmidt, Kurt 1974-84 57 (0,5) 40 (2,7) 15 
Notes: a) Numbers in parentheses = proportion in all articles; b) Period of office between 1965 and 2015, numbers 
in parentheses = proportion in all articles published during period of office; c) Articles published between first 
and second term of office.; * chairman. Source: own survey. 
 
